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Abstract
We present a functional framework for au-
tomated mechanism design based on a two-
stage game model of strategic interaction be-
tween the designer and the mechanism par-
ticipants, and apply it to several classes of
two-player infinite games of incomplete in-
formation. At the core of our framework
is a black-box optimization algorithm which
guides the selection process of candidate
mechanisms. Our approach yields optimal or
nearly optimal mechanisms in several appli-
cation domains using various objective func-
tions. By comparing our results with known
optimal mechanisms, and in some cases im-
proving on the best known mechanisms, we
provide evidence that ours is a promising ap-
proach to parametric design of indirect mech-
anisms.
1 Motivation
While the field of Mechanism Design has been quite
successful within a wide range of academic disciplines,
much of its progress came as a series of arduous the-
oretical efforts. In its practical applications, however,
successes have often been preceded by a series of set-
backs, with the drama of auctioning radio spectrum
licenses that unfolded in several countries providing a
powerful example [McMillan, 1994].
A difficulty in practical mechanism design that has
been especially emphasized is the unique nature of
most practical design problems. Often, this uniqueness
is manifest in the idiosyncratic nature of objectives and
constraints. For example, when the US government
tried to set up a mechanism to sell the radio spectrum
licenses, it identified among its objectives promotion
of rapid deployment of new technologies. Addition-
ally, it imposed a number of ad hoc constraints, such
as ensuring that some licenses go to minority-owned
and women-owned companies [McMillan, 1994].
Thus, a prime motivation for Conitzer and Sand-
holm’s automated mechanism design work [Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2002, 2003a] was to produce a frame-
work for solving mechanism design problems compu-
tationally given arbitrary objectives and constraints.
We likewise pursue this goal, and seek in addition to
avoid reliance on direct truthful mechanisms. This re-
liance has at its core the Revelation Principle [Myer-
son, 1981], which states that the outcome of any given
mechanism can still be achieved if we restrict the de-
sign space to mechanisms that induce truthful revela-
tion of agent preferences. While theoretically sound,
there have been criticisms of the principle on computa-
tional grounds, for example, those leveled by Conitzer
and Sandholm [2003b]. It is also well recognized that if
the design space is restricted in arbitrary ways, the rev-
elation principle need not hold. While the computa-
tional criticisms can often be addressed to some degree
within the spirit of direct mechanisms (e.g., by multi-
stage mechanisms, such as ascending auctions, which
implement partial revelation of agent preferences in a
series of steps), idiosyncratic constraints on the design
problem generally present a more difficult hurdle to
overcome.
In this work, we introduce an approach to the design
of general mechanisms (direct or indirect) given ar-
bitrary designer objectives and arbitrary constraints
on the design space, which we allow to be continuous.
We assume that mechanisms induce games of incom-
plete information in which agents have infinite sets of
strategies and types. As in most mechanism design
literature, we assume that the designer knows the set
of all possible agent types and their distribution, but
not the actual type realizations. Our main support
for the usefulness of our framework comes from ap-
plying it to several problems in auction design which
constrain the allocation and/or transfer functions to
a particular functional form. In practice, of course,
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we cannot possibly tackle an arbitrarily complex de-
sign space. Our simplification comes from assuming
that the designer seeks to find the best setting for par-
ticular design parameters. In other words, we allow
the designer to search for a mechanism in some subset
of an n-dimensional Euclidean space, rather than in
an arbitrary function space, as would be required in a
completely general setting. Furthermore, we believe
that many practical design problems involve search
for the optimal or nearly optimal setting of param-
eters within an existing infrustructure. For example,
it is much more likely that policy-makers will seek an
appropriate tax rate to achieve their objective than
overhaul the entire tax system.
In the following sections, we present our framework
for automated mechanism design and test it out in
several application domains. Our results suggest that
our approach has much promise: most of the designs
that we discover automatically are nearly as good as
or better than the best known hand-built designs in
the literature.
2 Notation
We restrict our attention to one-shot games
of incomplete information, denoted by
[I, {Ai}, {Ti}, F (·), {ui(a, t)}], where I refers to
the set of players and m = |I| is the number of play-
ers. Ai is the set of actions available to player i ∈ I,
with A = A1 × · · · × Am representing the set of joint
actions of all players. Ti is the set of types (private
information) of player i, with T = T1 × · · · × Tm
representing the joint type space, and F (·) is the joint
type distribution. We define a strategy of a player i
to be a function si : Ti → R, and use s(t) to denote
the vector (s1(t1), . . . , sm(tm)). It is often convenient
to refer to a strategy of player i separately from
that of the remaining players. To accommodate this,
we use a−i to denote the joint action of all players
other than i. Similarly, t−i designates the joint type
of all players other than i. We define the payoff
function of each player i by ui : A × T → R, where
ui(ai, ti, a−i, t−i) is the payoff to player i with type
ti for playing strategy ai when the remaining players
with joint types t−i play a−i.
3 Automated Mechanism Design
Framework
3.1 General Framework
We can model the strategic interactions between the
designer of the mechanism and its participants as a
two-stage game [Vorobeychik et al., 2006]. The de-
signer moves first by selecting a value θ from a set of
allowable mechanism settings, Θ. All the participant
agents observe the mechanism parameter θ and move
simultaneously thereafter.
Since the participants know the mechanism parameter,
we define a game between them in the second stage as
Γθ = [I, {Ai}, {Ti}, F (·), {ui(a, t, θ)}]. We refer to Γθ
as the game induced by θ. As is common in mecha-
nism design literature, we evaluate mechanisms with
respect to a sample Bayes-Nash equilibrium, s(t, θ).1
We say that given an outcome of play r, the designer’s
goal is to maximize a welfare function W (r, t, θ) with
respect to the distribution of types. Thus, given that
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, s(t, θ), is the relevant out-
come of play, the designer’s problem is to maximize
W (s(θ), θ) = Et[W (s(t, θ), t, θ)].2
Observe that if we knew s(t, θ) as a function of θ, the
designer would simply be faced with an optimization
problem. This insight is actually a consequence of the
application of backwards induction, which would have
us find s(t, θ) first for every θ and then compute an
optimal mechanism with respect to these equilibria. If
the design space were small, backwards induction ap-
plied to our model would thus yield an algorithm for
optimal mechanism design. Indeed, if additionally the
games Γθ featured small sets of players, strategies, and
types, we would say little more about the subject. Our
goal, however, is to develop a mechanism design tool
for settings in which it is infeasible to obtain a solu-
tion of Γθ for every θ ∈ Θ, either because the space of
possible mechanisms is large, or because solving (or ap-
proximating solutions to) Γθ is computationally daunt-
ing. Additionally, we try to avoid making assumptions
about the objective function or constraints on the de-
sign problem or the agent type distributions. We do
restrict the games to two players with piecewise lin-
ear utility functions, but allow them to have infinite
strategy and type sets.
In short, we propose the following high-level procedure
for finding optimal mechanisms:
1. Select a candidate mechanism, θ.
2. Find (approximate) solutions to Γθ.
3. Evaluate the objective and constraints given so-
lutions to Γθ.
4. Repeat this procedure for a specified number of
steps.
1Focus on a sample equilibrium is typically justified by
allowing the designer to suggest the equilibrium to partic-
ipants, presuming that no agent will subsequently have an
incentive to deviate.
2Note the overloading of W (·).
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Figure 1: Automated mechanism design procedure
based on black-box optimization.
5. Return an approximately optimal design based on
the resulting optimization path.
We visually represent this procedure by a diagram in
Figure 1.
3.2 Designer’s Optimization Problem
We begin by treating the designer’s problem as black-
box optimization, where the black box produces a
noisy evaluation of an input design parameter, θ, with
respect to the designer’s objective, W (s(θ), θ), given
the game-theoretic predictions of play. Once we frame
the problem as a black-box optimization problem, we
can draw on a wealth of literature devoted to develop-
ing methods to approximate optimal solutions [Spall,
2003]. While we can in principle select a number of
these, we have chosen simulated annealing, as it has
proved quite effective for a great variety of simulation
optimization problems in noisy settings with many lo-
cal optima.
As an application of black-box optimization, the mech-
anism design problem in our formulation is just one of
many problems that can be addressed with one of a se-
lection of methods. What makes it special is the sub-
problem of evaluating the objective function for a given
mechanism choice, and the particular nature of mech-
anism design constraints which are evaluated based on
Nash equilibrium outcomes and agent types.
3.3 Objective Evaluation
As implied by the backwards induction process, we
must obtain the solutions (Bayes-Nash equilibria in
our case) to the games induced by the design choice,
θ, in order to evaluate the objective function. In gen-
eral, this is simply not possible to do, since Bayes-Nash
equilibria may not even exist in an arbitrary game, nor
is there a general-purpose tool to find them.
To the best of our knowledge, the only solver for a
broad class of infinite games of incomplete information
was introduced by Reeves and Wellman [2004] (hence-
forth, RW). Indeed, RW is a best-response finder,
which has successfully been used iteratively to obtain
sample Bayes-Nash equilibria for a restricted class of
infinite two-player games of incomplete information.
Since the goal of automated mechanism design is to
approximate solutions to design problems with arbi-
trary objectives and constraints and to handle games
with arbitrary type distributions, we treat the prob-
ability distribution over player types as a black box
from which we can sample joint player types. Thus,
we use numerical integration (sample mean in our im-
plementation) to evaluate the expectation of the objec-
tive with respect to player types, thereby introducing
noise into objective evaluation.
3.4 Dealing with Constraints
Mechanism design can feature any of the following
three classes of constraints: ex ante (constraints eval-
uated with respect to the joint distribution of types),
ex interim (evaluated separately for each player and
type with respect to the joint type distribution of other
players), and ex post (evaluated for every joint type
profile). When the type space is infinite we of course
cannot numerically evaluate any expression for ev-
ery type. We therefore replace these constraints with
probabilistic constraints that must hold for “most”
types (i.e., a set of types with large probability mea-
sure). Intuitively, it is unlikely to matter if a con-
straint fails for types that occur with probability zero.
We conjecture, further, that in most practical design
problems, violation of a constraint on a “small” set
of types will also be of little consequence, either be-
cause the resulting design is easy to fix, or because the
other types will likely not have very beneficial devi-
ations even if they account in their decisions for the
effect of these unlikely types on the game dynamics.
We support this conjecture via a series of applications
of our framework: in none of these did our constraint
relaxation lead the designer much astray.
Even when we weaken constraints based on agent type
sets to their probabilistic equivalents, we still need a
way to verify that such constraints hold by sampling
from the type distribution. Since we can take only a
finite number of samples, we will in fact verify a prob-
abilistic constraint only at some level of confidence.
The question we want to ask, then, is how many sam-
ples do we need in order to say with probability at
least 1−α that the probability of seeing a type profile
for which the constraint is violated is no more than p?
That is the subject of the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let B denote a set on which a probabilis-
tic constraint is violated, and suppose that we have a
uniform prior over the interval [0, 1] on the probabil-
ity measure of B. Then, we need at least logαlog(1−p) − 1
samples to verify with probability at least 1−α that the
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measure of B is at most p.
The proofs of this and other results can be found in
the appendix of the full version of this paper.
We next describe three specific constraints employed
in our applications.
Equilibrium Convergence Constraint Given
that our game solutions are produced by a heuristic
(iterative best-response) algorithm, they are not in-
herently guaranteed to represent equilibria of the can-
didate mechanism. We can instead enforce this prop-
erty through an explicit constraint. The problem that
we cannot in practice evaluate this constraint for every
joint type profile is resolved by making it probabilistic,
as described above. Thus, we define a (1 − p)-strong
equilibrium convergence constraint :
Definition 1. Let s(t) be the last strategy profile pro-
duced in a sequence of solver iterations, and let s′(t)
immediately precede s(t) in this sequence. Then the
(1−p)-strong equilibrium convergence constraint is sat-
isfied if for a set of type profiles t with probability mea-
sure no less than 1 − p, |s(t) − s′(t)| < δ for some a
priori fixed tolerance level δ.
Ex Interim Individual Rationality Ex-Interim-
IR specifies that for every agent and type, that agent’s
expected utility conditional on its type is greater than
its opportunity cost of participating in the mechanism.
Again, in the automated mechanism design frame-
work, we must change this to a probabilistic constraint
as described above.
Definition 2. The (1− p)-strong Ex-Interim-IR con-
straint is satisfied when for every agent i ∈ I, and for
a set of types ti ∈ Ti with probability measure no less
than 1− p, Et−iui(t, s(t)|ti) ≥ Ci(ti)− δ, where Ci(ti)
is the opportunity cost of agent i with type ti of partic-
ipating in the mechanism, and δ is some a priori fixed
tolerance level.
Commonly in the mechanism design literature the op-
portunity cost of participation, Ci(ti), is assumed to
be zero but this assumption may not hold, for exam-
ple, in an auction where not participating would be a
give-away to competitors and entail negative utility.
Minimum Revenue Constraint The final con-
straint that we consider ensures that the designer will
obtain some minimal amount of revenue (or bound its
loss) in attaining a non-revenue-related objective.
Definition 3. The minimum revenue constraint is
satisfied if Etk(s(t), t) ≥ C, where k(s(t), t) is the to-
tal payment made to the designer by agents with joint
strategy s(t) and joint type profile t, and C is the lower
bound on revenue.
4 Extended Example: Shared-Good
Auction (SGA)
4.1 Setup
Consider the problem of two people trying to decide
between two options. Unless both players prefer the
same option, no standard voting mechanism (with ei-
ther straight votes or a ranking of the alternatives) can
help with this problem. Instead we propose a simple
auction: each player submits a bid and the player with
the higher bid wins, paying some function of the bids
to the loser in compensation.
We define a space of mechanisms for this problem
that are all budget balanced, individually rational, and
(assuming monotone strategies) socially efficient. We
then search the mechanism space for games that sat-
isfy additional properties. The following is a payoff
function defining a space of games parametrized by
the function f .
u(t, a, t′, a′) =

t− f(a, a′) if a > a′
0.5t if a = a′
f(a′, a) if a < a′,
(1)
where u() gives the utility for an agent who has a value
t for winning and chooses to bid a against an agent
who has value t′ and bids a′. The ts are the agents’
types and the as their actions. Finally, f() is some
function of the two bids.3 In the tie-breaking case
(which occurs with probability zero for many classes
of strategies) the payoff is the average of the two other
cases, i.e., the winner is chosen by a coin flip.
We now consider a restriction of the class of mecha-
nisms defined above.
Definition 4. SGA(h, k) is the mechanism defined by
Equation 1 with f(a, a′) = ha+ ka′, h, k ∈ [0, 1].
For example, in SGA(1/2, 0) the winner pays half its
own bid to the loser. More generally, h and k will
be the relative proportions of winner’s and loser’s bids
that will be transfered from the winner to the loser.
We now give Bayes-Nash equilibria for such games
when types are uniform.
Theorem 2. For h, k ≥ 0 and types U [A,B] with
B ≥ A + 1 the following is a symmetric Bayes-Nash
equilibrium of SGA(h, k):
s(t) =
t
3(h+ k)
+
hA+ kB
6(h+ k)2
For the following discussion, we need to define the no-
tion of truthfulness, or Bayes-Nash incentive compat-
ibility.
3 Reeves [2005] considered the case f(a, a′) = a/2.
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Definition 5 (BNIC). A mechanism is Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible (truthful) if bidding s(t) = t con-
stitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game induced
by the mechanism.
The Revelation Principle [Mas-Colell et al., 1995] guar-
antees that for any mechanism, there exists a BNIC
mechanism that is equivalent in terms of how it maps
preferences to outcomes.
We can now characterize the truthful mechanisms in
this space. According to Theorem 2, SGA(1/3, 0) is
truthful for U [0, B] types. We now show that this is
the only truthful design in this design space.
Theorem 3. With U [0, B] types (B > 0), SGA(h, k)
is BNIC if and only if h = 1/3 and k = 0.
Below, we show concrete examples of the failure of
the revelation principle for several sensible designer
objectives.
From here on we restrict ourselves to the case of U [0, 1]
types. Since SGA(1/3, 0) is the only truthful mecha-
nism in our design space, we can directly compare the
objective value obtained from this mechanism and the
best indirect mechanism in the sections that follow.
4.2 Automated Design Problems
Minimize Difference in Expected Utility First,
we consider as our objective fairness, or negative dif-
ferences between the expected utility of winner and
loser. Alternatively, our goal is to minimize
|Et,t′ [u(t, s(t), t′, s(t′), k, h | a > a′)−
− u(t, s(t), t′, s(t′), k, h | a < a′)]|. (2)
We first use the equilibrium bid derived above to ana-
lytically characterize optimal mechanisms.
Theorem 4. The objective value in (2) for SGA(h, k)
is (2h+ k)/9(h+ k). Furthermore, SGA(0, k), for any
k > 0, minimizes the objective, and the optimum is
1/9.
By comparison, the objective value for the truth-
ful mechanism, SGA(1/3, 0), is 2/9, twice as high as
the minimum produced by an untruthful mechanism.
Thus, the revelation principle does not hold for this ob-
jective function in our design space. We can use Theo-
rem 4 to find that the objective value for SGA(1/2, 0),
the mechanism described by Reeves [2005], is 2/9.
Now, to test our framework, we imagine we do not
know about the above analytic derivations (including
the derivation of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium) and run
the automated mechanism design procedure in black-
box mode. Table 1 presents results when we start the
Parameters Initial Design Final Design
h 0.5 0
k 0 1
objective 2/9 1/9
h random 0
k random 1
objective N/A 1/9
Table 1: Design that approximately maximizes fair-
ness (minimizes difference in expected utility between
utility of winner and loser) when the optimization
search starts at a fixed starting point, and the best
mechanism from five random restarts.
search at random values of h and k (taking the best
outcome from 5 random restarts), and at the start-
ing values of h = 0.5 and k = 0. Since the objective
function turns out to be fairly simple, it is not surpris-
ing that we obtain the optimal mechanism for specific
and random starting points (indeed, the optimal de-
sign was produced from every random starting point
we generated).
Minimize Expected (Ex-Ante) Difference in
Utility Here we modify the objective function
slightly as compared to the previous section, and in-
stead aim to minimize the expected ex ante difference
in utility:
E|u(t, s(t), t′, s(t′), k, h|a > a′)
− u(t, s(t), t′, s(t′), k, h|a < a′)|. (3)
While the only difference from the previous section
is the placement of the absolute value sign inside the
expectation, this difference complicates the analytic
derivation of the optimal design considerably. There-
fore, we do not present the actual optimum design val-
ues.
Parameters Initial Design Final Design
h 0.5 0.49
k 0 1
objective 0.22 0.176
h random 0.29
k random 0.83
objective N/A 0.176
Table 2: Design that approximately minimizes ex-
pected ex ante difference between utility of winner and
loser when the optimization search starts at a random
and a fixed starting points.
The results of application of our AMD framework are
presented in Table 2. While the objective function
in this example appears somewhat complex, it turns
out (as we discovered through additional exploration)
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that there are many mechanisms that yield nearly op-
timal objective values.4 Thus, both random restarts
as well as a fixed starting point produced essentially
the same near-optima. By comparison, the truthful
design yields the objective value of about 0.22, which
is considerably worse.
Maximize Expected Utility of the Winner
Yet another objective in the shared-good-auction
domain is to maximize the expected utility of
the winner. Formally, the designer is maximizing
E[u(t, s(t), t′, s(t′), k, h | a > a′)].
We first analytically derive the characterization of op-
timal mechanisms.
Theorem 5. The problem is equivalent to finding
(h, k) that maximize 4/9− k/[18(h+ k)]. Thus, k = 0
and h > 0 maximize the objective, and the optimum is
4/9.
Parameters Initial Design Final Design
h 0.5 0.21
k 0 0
objective 4/9 4/9
h random 0.91
k random 0.03
objective N/A 0.443
Table 3: Design that approximately maximizes the
winner’s expected utility.
Here again our results in Table 3 are optimal or very
nearly optimal, unsurprisingly for this relatively sim-
ple application.
Of the examples we considered so far, most turned out
to be analytic, and only one we could only approach
numerically. Nevertheless, even in the analytic cases,
the objective function forms were not trivial, particu-
larly from a blind optimization perspective. Further-
more, we must take into account that even the simple
cases are somewhat complicated by the presence of
noise, and thus we need not arrive at global optima
even in the simplest of settings so long as the number
of samples is not very large.
Having found success in the simple shared-good auc-
tion setting, we now turn our attention to a series of
considerably more difficult problems.
4Particularly, we carried out a far more intensive ex-
ploration of the search space given the analytic expression
for the Bayes-Nash equilibrium to ascertain that the values
reported are close to actual optima. Indeed, we failed to
improve on these.
5 Applications
We present results from several applications of our au-
tomated mechanism design framework to specific two-
player problems. One of these problems, finding auc-
tions that yield maximum revenue to the designer, has
been studied in a seminal paper by Myerson [1981] in a
much more general setting than ours. Another, which
seeks to find auctions that maximize social welfare,
has also been studied more generally. Additionally, in
several instances we were able to derive optima ana-
lytically. For all of these we have a known benchmark
to strive for. Others have no known optimal design.
In all of our applications player types are indepen-
dently distributed with uniform distribution on the
unit interval. Finally, we used 50 samples from the
type distribution to verify Ex-Interim-IR. This gives
us 0.95 probability that 94% of types lose no more than
the opportunity cost plus our specified tolerance which
we add to ensure that the presence of noise does not
overconstrain the problem. It turns out that every ap-
plication that we consider produces a mechanism that
is individually rational for all types with respect to the
tolerance level that was set.
5.1 Myerson Auctions
The seminal paper by Myerson [1981] presented a
theoretical derivation of revenue maximizing auctions
in a relatively general setting. Here, our aim is to
find a mechanism with a nearly-optimal value of some
given objective function, of which revenue is an ex-
ample.5 However, we restrict ourselves to a consider-
ably less general setting than did Myerson, constrain-
ing our design space to that described by the parame-
ters q, k1, k2,K1, k3, k4,K2 in (4).
u(t, a, t′, a′) =

U1 if a > a′
0.5(U1 + U2) if a = a′
U2 if a < a′,
(4)
where U1 = qt− k1a− k2a′ −K1 and U2 = (1− q)t−
k3a − k4a′ −K2. We further constrain all the design
parameters to be in the interval [0,1]. In standard
terminology, our design space allows the designer to
choose an allocation parameter, q, which determines
the probability that the winner (i.e., agent with the
winning bid) gets the good, and transfers, which we
constrain to be linear in agents’ bids.
While our automated mechanism design framework as-
sures us that p-strong individual rationality will hold
5Conitzer and Sandholm [2003a] also tackled Myerson’s
problem, but assumed finite type and strategy spaces of
agents, as well as a finite design space.
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with the desired confidence, we can actually verify it
by hand in this application. Furthermore, we can ad-
just the mechanism to account for lapses in individual
rationality guarantees for subsets of agent types by
giving to each agent the amount of the expected loss
of the least fortunate type.6 Similarly, if we do find
a mechanism that is Ex-Interim-IR, we may still have
an opportunity to increase expected revenue as long
as the minimum expected gain of any type is strictly
greater than zero.
Maximize Revenue Here we are interested in find-
ing approximately revenue-maximizing designs in our
constrained design space. First, we derive the follow-
ing based on Myerson’s feasibility constraints:
Theorem 6. Optimal incentive compatible mecha-
nism in our setting yields the revenue of 1/3, which
can be achieved by selecting q = 1, k1 ∈ [0, 0.5], and
k2 ∈ [0, 1], respecting the constraint that k1 + 0.5k2 =
0.5.
In addition to performing five restarts from random
starting points, we repeated the simulated annealing
procedure starting with the best design produced via
the random restarts. This procedure yielded an
Ex-Interim-IR design with expected revenue of
approximately 0.3. We used the RW solver to find a
symmetric equilibrium of this design, under which the
bids are s(t) = 0.72t− 0.73.7 We have already shown
that the best known design, which is also the optimal
incentive compatible mechanism in this setting, yields
a revenue of 1/3 to the designer. Thus, our AMD
framework produced a design near to the best known.
It is an open question what the actual global optimum
is.
Maximize Welfare It is well known that the Vick-
rey auction is welfare-optimal. Thus, we know that
the welfare optimum is attainable in our design space.
Before proceeding with search, however, we must make
one observation. While we are interested in welfare, it
would be inadvisable in general to completely ignore
the designer’s revenue, since the designer is unlikely to
be persuaded to run a mechanism at a disproportion-
ate loss. To illustrate, take the same Vickrey auction,
but afford each agent one billion dollars for participat-
ing. This mechanism is still welfare-optimal, but seems
a senseless waste if optimality could be achieved with-
out such spending (and, indeed, at some profit to the
auctioneer). To remedy this problem, we use a mini-
mum revenue constraint, ensuring that no mechanism
that is too costly will be selected as optimal.
6Observe that such constant transfers will not affect
agent incentives.
7This equilibrium is approximate in the sense that we
rounded the parameters to the nearest hundredth.
First, we present a general result that characterizes
welfare-optimal mechanisms in our setting.
Theorem 7. Welfare is maximized if either the equi-
librium bid function is strictly increasing and q = 1 or
the equilibrium bid function is strictly decreasing and
q = 0. Furthermore, the maximum expected welfare in
our design space is 2/3.
Thus, for example, both first- and second-price sealed
bid auctions are welfare-optimizing (as is well known).
The result of our search for optimal design is
an Ex-Interim-IR mechanism which allocated
the object to the highest bidder. This mecha-
nism yields expected revenue of approximately
0.2 to the designer. We verified using the RW solver
that the bid function s(t) = 0.645t − 0.44 is an equi-
librium given this design. Since it is strictly increasing
in t, we can conclude based on Theorem 7 that this
design is welfare-optimal.
5.2 Vicious Auctions
In this section we study a design problem motivated by
the Vicious Vickrey auction [Brandt and Weiß, 2001].
The essence of this auction is that while it is designed
exactly like a regular Vickrey auction, the players get
disutility from the utility of the other player, which
is a function of parameter l, with the regular Vickrey
auction the special case of l = 0.
We generalize the Vicious Vickrey auction design using
the same parameters as in the previous section such
that the Vicious Vickrey auction is a special case with
q = k2 = 1 and k1 = k2 = k3 = k4 = K1 = K2 =
0, and the utility function of agents presented in the
previous section can be recovered when l = 0. We
assume in this construction that payments, which will
be the same (as functions of players’ bids and design
parameters) as in the Myerson auction setting, have a
particular effect on players’ utility parametrized by l.
Hence, the utility function in (5).
u(t, a, t′, a′) =

U1 if a > a′
0.5(U1 + U2) if a = a′
U2 if a < a′
(5)
where U1 = q(1 − l)t − (k1(q(1 − l) + (1 − q)) − (1 −
q)l)a− ((1− q)l)t′ − k2(q(1− l) + (1− q))a′ −K1 and
U2 = (1− q)(1− l)t− (k3((1− q)(1− l) + q)− ql)a−
qlt′ − k4((1 − q)(1 − l) + q)a′ − K2. In all the re-
sults below, we fix l = 2/7. Reeves [2005] reports an
equilibrium for Vicious Vickrey with this value of l
to be s(t) = (7/9)t + 2/9. Thus, we can see that we
are no longer assured incentive compatibility even in
the second-price auction case. In general, it is unclear
whether there exist incentive compatible mechanisms
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in this design space, particularly because we constrain
all our parameters to lie in the interval [0, 1].
In the applications below, we redefined the individual
rationality constraint in terms of an agent’s opportu-
nity cost of participation in the auction.
Maximize Revenue Our first objective is to
(nearly) maximize revenue in this domain. Our AMD
framework achieves an Ex-Interim-IR mecha-
nism with expected revenue of approximately
0.44. By comparison, a Vicious Vickrey auc-
tion achieves revenue of 0.48, but is not Ex-
Interim-IR.
Maximize Welfare We now tackle the objective of
maximizing welfare using our AMD framework. The
result is a mechanism with expected welfare of
approximately 0.54, which is not Ex-Interim-
IR. However, the designer can pay each agent
0.065, thereby making the design individually
rational, and still maintain positive revenue.
Maximize Weighted Sum of Revenue and Wel-
fare In this section, we present results of AMD with
the goal of maximizing the weighted sum of revenue
and welfare. For simplicity (and having no reason
for doing otherwise), we set weights to be equal.
Our framework found a mechanism which is
welfare-optimal and yields revenue of 0.52 af-
ter an adjustment which makes it Ex-Interim-
IR. Interestingly, we were much more successful in
both revenue and welfare objectives by eliminating the
hard minimum revenue constraint and instead making
it a part of the objective. Indeed, we found here the
best mechanism so far for both objectives we consid-
ered, suggesting that there is also synergy between the
two objectives.
6 Conclusion
We presented a framework for automated design of
general mechanisms (direct or indirect) using the
Bayes-Nash equilibrium solver for infinite games de-
veloped by Reeves and Wellman [2004]. Results from
applying this framework to several design domains
demonstrate the value of our approach for practical
mechanism design. The mechanisms that we found
were typically either close to the best known mecha-
nisms, or better.
While in principle it is not at all surprising that we
can find mechanisms by searching the design space—
as long as we have an equilibrium finding tool—it was
not at all clear that any such system will have practical
merit. We presented evidence that indirect mechanism
design in a constrained space can indeed be effectively
automated on somewhat realistic design problems that
yield very large games of incomplete information. Un-
doubtedly, real design problems are vastly more com-
plicated than any that we considered (or any that can
be considered theoretically). In such cases, we believe
that our approach could offer considerable benefit if
used in conjunction with other techniques, either to
provide a starting point for design, or to tune a mech-
anism produced via theoretical analysis and computa-
tional experiments.
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